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Internet freedom remained restricted in Vietnam, as the government enforced stringent controls over the country’s online environment. Though previously imposed connectivity disruptions and throttling of Facebook servers did not recur, the state continued mandating that companies remove content and imposed draconian criminal sentences for online expression. Online political organizing was sharply restricted ahead of the May 2021 legislative elections.
Vietnam is a one-party state, dominated for decades by the ruling Communist buổi tiệc ngọt of Vietnam (CPV). Although some independent candidates are technically allowed to run in legislative elections, most are banned in practice. Freedom of expression, religious freedom, và civil society activism are tightly restricted. Judicial independence is absent.
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Unlike during the previous coverage period, there were no temporary disruptions khổng lồ connectivity or restrictions on Facebook’s country-based servers (see A3 & B1).Facebook revealed that the government had threatened lớn shut down its services in Vietnam should the company refuse to lớn comply with requests for broader restrictions on critical nội dung in November 2020. Subsequently, government requests for content removals reached record highs (see B2).The government restricted independent candidates from campaigning on social truyền thông in the May 2021 legislative elections, arresting some who announced their candidacy online and targeting others with smear campaigns (see B8).A draft decree on personal data protection was released in February 2021. If passed, it would require platforms to lớn store data on Vietnamese users in the country và to provide that data to the government upon request (see C6).Several activists, bloggers, and individuals were handed severe prison sentences for their online speech, including three online journalists whose sentences ranged between 11 & 15 years imprisonment (see C7).
| Do infrastructural limitations restrict access to the mạng internet or the speed and unique of internet connections? | 4.004 6.006 |
The mạng internet penetration rate was 68.70 percent by the over of 2019, according to lớn ITU data.1 thiết bị di động broadband has played a significant role in increasing access lớn faster internet service. As of July 2021, the average mobile download speed stood at 42.46 megabits per second (Mbps) while the upload tốc độ stood at 19.25 Mbps according to lớn Ookla’s Speedtest Global Index, placing Vietnam at 58th place in a global ranking of 141 countries and territories. The average fixed broadband download speed was 78.43 Mbps and upload speed was 68.38 Mbps, putting Vietnam in 59th place.2 One source estimated điện thoại penetration at 61.37 percent as of May 2021.3 Fixed broadband remains a relatively small market segment.
In the first quarter of 2017, Vina
Phone became the first provider lớn roll out a 4G network in Hanoi, Ho đưa ra Minh City, and 11 other provinces.4 By the end of 2019, it covered 100 percent of the population with its 4G signal.5 In April 2019, military-owned thiết bị di động service provider Viettel began the first pilot for a 5G network;6 by February 2021, it had over 17,000 registered 5G subscribers.7 Vinaphone and Mobiphone have also joined the 5G market.
Disruptions to the Asia Pacific Gateway (APG) in January và February 2021 affected most mạng internet service providers (ISPs) & disrupted service.8 The cables are pivotal for connectivity khổng lồ the international internet.
| Is access lớn the internet prohibitively expensive or beyond the reach of certain segments of the population for geographical, social, or other reasons? | 2.002 3.003 |
Access khổng lồ the internet has become more affordable for most segments of the population, including those in rural areas, but connectivity remains out of reach for those living in extreme poverty, which is found in many communities of minority ethnicities in mountainous areas. The most inexpensive monthly di động data plan cost around $2 in 2021,1 while a fixed-line package cost around $7.2 The average monthly wage was $280 as of July 2020.3
| Does the government exercise technical or legal control over internet infrastructure for the purposes of restricting connectivity? | 4.004 6.006 |
Score Change: The score improved from 3 khổng lồ 4 because there were no temporary connectivity disruptions or restriction on Facebook’s country-based servers reported; both were imposed during the previous coverage period.
There were no significant disruptions to internet or smartphone networks during the coverage period. Authorities have sometimes employed periodic throttling và restricted access to lớn the internet for political or security reasons in the past.
Connectivity was previously restricted several times in the Đồng trung ương commune, a village on the outskirts of Hanoi. In 2017, 3G access và a phone signal were briefly unavailable during a violent land dispute. Similar restrictions were reported in January 2020, following violent clashes over the same dispute.1 Reuters reported that Facebook’s country-based servers were taken offline in February 2020, significantly slowing Facebook, Instagram, và Whats
App services for users in Vietnam (see B1).2 Access was restored in early April 2020, after the company allegedly agreed khổng lồ remove significantly more “antistate” content (see B2).
The government retains the ability khổng lồ restrict connectivity because of its technical control over infrastructure. While several companies have licenses khổng lồ build infrastructure, the state-owned Vietnam Posts & Telecommunications Group (VNPT) và military-owned Viettel dominate the country"s telecommunications sector. Two out of three major providers servicing mạng internet exchange points (IXPs), which allocate bandwidth lớn service providers, are state- or military-owned (VNPT and Viettel).3
| Are there legal, regulatory, or econoova.edu.vn obstacles that restrict the diversity of service providers? | 2.002 6.006 |
Though any firm is allowed khổng lồ operate as an ISP, informal barriers prevent new companies without political ties or econoova.edu.vn clout from disrupting the market. As of September 2020, the three largest broadband providers are VNPT (which controls around 40 percent of the market), Viettel (around 38 percent), và the private FPT (around 14 percent).1
In the điện thoại sector, Viettel commands 50.5 percent of di động subscriptions, while Vina
Phone & Mobi
Fone rank second và third with 24.6 percent and 21.1 percent, respectively. These three providers controlled a combined 96.2 percent of thiết bị di động subscriptions in 2019, a 1-percent increase over their 2018 share. Smaller companies that lack the infrastructure khổng lồ provide chất lượng service and coverage, lượt thích Vietnamobile & Gmobile, struggle khổng lồ compete.2
| Do national regulatory bodies that oversee service providers and digital công nghệ fail lớn operate in a free, fair, & independent manner? | 0.000 4.004 |
Various government agencies regulate và oversee digital giải pháp công nghệ in an ad hoc, nontransparent manner, without public consultation. Guidelines for regulating the telecommunications sector are provided by the CPV, compromising the independence of regulatory bodies.
The Vietnam internet Network Information Center (VNNIC), an tiếp thị liên kết of the Ministry of Information và Communications (ova.edu.vn), is responsible for managing, allocating, supervising, và promoting the use of internet tên miền names, IP addresses, and autonomous system numbers.1 Two ministries—the ova.edu.vn2 và the Ministry of Public Security (MPS)3 manage the provision and usage of internet services. In practice, censorship of online content could be ordered by any government body.
Xem thêm: Đau Bụng Phía Trên Bên Phải ? Đau Bụng Trên Bên Phải Cảnh Báo Bệnh Gì
| Does the state block or filter, or compel service providers khổng lồ block or filter, mạng internet content, particularly material that is protected by international human rights standards? | 2.002 6.006 |
The Vietnamese authorities have established an effective content-filtering system. Social truyền thông and communications apps remained available during the coverage period, despite being periodically blocked in previous years.
Censorship frequently targets high-profile blogs or websites with many followers, as well as content considered threatening lớn the rule of the CPV, including social unrest, political dissent, advocacy for human rights and democracy, và criticism of the government’s reaction to border & maritime disputes with China. Content promoting organized religions such as Buddhism, Roman Catholicism, and the Cao Đài group, which the state considers a potential threat, is blocked to lớn a lesser but still significant degree. Websites critical of the government are generally inaccessible, such as Talawas, Dân Luận, cách thức Khoa, The Vietnamese, vn Thời báo, Dân có tác dụng Báo, Diễn đàn Xã hội Dân sự, & Bauxite Vietnam. Access to international websites such as those of Human Rights Watch (HRW), và the Vietnamese editions of Radio không lấy phí Asia (RFA) & the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) has been unstable và unpredictable.
According to the MPS’s website, the ministry’s Department of Cybersecurity & High-Tech Crime Prevention & Control monitored và blocked almost 3,400 overseas-hosted websites that “published toxic & harmful information” in 2020.1 The ova.edu.vn also stated in October 2020 that it had blocked 100 websites hosting pirated websites, 200 online games websites operating without licenses, 300 gambling websites, và 300 pornography websites.2
Social media and communications platforms were not blocked during the coverage period. However, in November 2020, the Vietnamese government reportedly threatened lớn shut down Facebook’s service in Vietnam should the company refuse khổng lồ comply with the government’s request for a larger scale of nội dung restrictions. 3
In February 2020, Reuters reported that state-owned telecommunications companies took Facebook’s local servers offline, significantly slowing services across Facebook, Instagram, và Whats
App for Vietnamese users (see A3).4 Access was restored in early April after the company allegedly agreed to lớn remove significantly more “antistate” content (see B2). Previously, in 2016, access lớn Facebook and Instagram was interrupted during protests in Hanoi & Ho chi Minh thành phố against an environmental disaster caused by a steel plant owned by Formosa, a Taiwanese company.5
| Do state or nonstate actors employ legal, administrative, or other means to lớn force publishers, content hosts, or digital platforms to delete content, particularly material that is protected by international human rights standards? | 0.000 4.004 |
Content was removed at an alarming rate during the coverage period, và the government used the Cybersecurity Law, which took effect in January 2019, khổng lồ pressure social truyền thông media companies to lớn comply with nội dung removal requests.1 The regular removal of content has led users khổng lồ employ the common practice of sharing screenshots of online articles that they think are likely to be removed later, rather than sharing their URLs.
Authorities have imposed heavy fines and suspended online publications due to critical comments on their platforms in recent years. In May 2020, before the coverage period, the government fined the newspaper Phụ con gái TPHCM (Ho đưa ra Minh đô thị Women) 55 million dong ($2,400) and suspended its trang web for a month, alleging the outlet published “wrongful information” about the Sun Group, a real-estate development company, in a series of investigative articles about the company’s damaging impact on the environment.2
Social truyền thông media platforms và technology companies remove content upon request from the government. In early April 2020, full access lớn Facebook’s local servers was restored only after the company agreed khổng lồ remove significantly more “antistate” nội dung (see A3 và B1).3 That same month, Facebook removed two posts linking to lớn RFA’s Vietnamese-language news site, citing local law. In 2020, the MPS requested more than 10,000 posts be removed or deactivated from online platforms.4
Social truyền thông media platforms, including Facebook & Google, restricted nội dung at the government’s request at a higher rate than ever before during the coverage period. According khổng lồ the ova.edu.vn’s report to lớn the National Assembly in October 2020, the volume of Facebook’s nội dung removals in 2020 increased 500 percent compared khổng lồ 2019, reaching 95 percent of the total government requests for removals. The removal rate was 90 percent in the case of Google và its services, which included almost 11,000 You
Tube videos removed within the first nine months of 2020. Besides alleged false information relating lớn COVID-19, the report says the content removed or filtered also includes “defamation against the buổi tiệc nhỏ and State officials.”
The report emphasizes that Facebook had agreed lớn block political advertisements from pages for và accounts owned by organizations deemed reactionary & terrorist—frequently nonviolent opposition groups. Google also agreed to lớn not sharing advertising revenue for “content that violates Vietnam’s law” upon the Ministry’s requests.5
In another statement, the ova.edu.vn said that Facebook had removed 2,311 posts between January và November 2020. Google blocked and removed over 29,000 videos và 24 You
Tube channels deemed khổng lồ be publishing antiparty or antistate content including government criticism, over that same period, according khổng lồ the ova.edu.vn. 6
Activists và dissidents, including those living outside of Vietnam, have increasingly had their Facebook accounts suspended for violating the platform’s community standards. Blogger Bùi Văn Thuận, for instance, had his Facebook tài khoản suspended & then permanently banned after he criticized the government’s role in the Đồng chổ chính giữa dispute in a January 2020 Facebook post. His account was not reinstated until September 2020, following pressure from civil society and inquiries from the press.7
The government also pressures individuals khổng lồ remove their content. Amnesty International reported that police summoned users to lớn police stations between January and March 2020 and forced them lớn remove posts discussing COVID-19 (see C3).8
Other entities with financial and political influence may exert control over online nội dung or discourage free expression. Many Facebook users experienced nội dung restrictions or tài khoản blocking in February 2021 relating khổng lồ posts that criticized the major domestic oto manufacturer Vinfast, which is a subsidiary of Vingroup, one of the country’s largest conglomerates.9 Similar reprisals have been reported in previous years; for instance, negative news stories about Vingroup have reportedly been removed from state-owned truyền thông sites and Facebook.10
On the day of the May 2021 legislative elections, online state media outlets removed reporting on independent candidate Lương nuốm Huy without explanation.11
Intermediary liability was formalized in 2013 with Decree 72 on the Management, Provision, Use of internet Services and Internet nội dung Online. It requires intermediaries—including those based overseas—to regulate third-party contributors in cooperation with the state, and to “eliminate or prevent information” that opposes the republic, threatens national security and the social order, or defies national traditions, among other broadly worded provisions. The decree holds cybercafé owners responsible if their customers are caught surfing “bad” websites. The regulation process was articulated in Circular 09/2014/TT-BTTTT, issued in 2014, which requires website owners khổng lồ eliminate “incorrect” nội dung “within three hours” of its detection or receipt of a request from a competent authority in the size of an email, text message, or phone call.
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Tên thanh toán giao dịch quốc tế: Vietnam internet Network Information Center (viết tắt là: VNNIC).
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